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Living with numbers: Accounting for subjectivity in 






The disembodying and disembedding of work through systems of abstraction (such as 
management accounting systems) were fundamental to the establishment of regimes of 
management that act, not directly and immediately on others, but instead acts upon their 
actions—i.e. the establishment of management as a regime of governmentality.  Time-
space distanciation, through abstraction (such as numbers) and electronic mediation, has 
radically transformed the way organisational actors interrelate and make sense of their 
everyday organisational lives.  This paper argues and shows that phenomenology, in 
particular the work of Michel Henry, can help us understand how actors live their lives in 
and through the simultaneity of systems of abstraction and their affective, embodied and 
situated living praxis. The paper presents a case study of how different organisational 
actors (managers and controllers) make sense of, and live with, the numbers in a 
management accounting system—numbers that affect them quite profoundly. The 
analysis of the case shows that all interpretation, sense-making and argumentation of, 
and with the numbers are rendered possible through re-embodiment. Such a re-
embodiment, in turn, require as necessary a prior reference to their subjective affective 
life—their own living praxis. If this is the case, as we hope our research shows, then 
subjective affective life should not be subjugated by the formal rational discourse of 
management but should rather be seen for what it is—the very source of meaning that is 
the condition of possibility for abstraction and mediation to be possible at all. The paper 
concludes with some implications of Henry’s phenomenology of life for organisations and 
management research.         
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1. Introduction  
It is widely acknowledged that the development and utilisation of management 
accounting systems (MAS) was fundamental to the emergence of the industrial 
socio-economic infrastructure (Hopwood, 1987; Fleischman & Tyson, 1993).  It is 
possible to argue that it is MAS’s ability to translate broad economic principles into 
directly actionable operational imperatives, which can direct and govern action, 
that locates MAS at the centre of managerial intentions. As a technology of control 
that renders action visible it constitutes what Foucault (1997) might call a regime 
of governmentality.  As a regime of governmentality MAS constitutes “a mode of 
action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon 
the actions of others, and presupposes the freedom to act in one way or another” 
(Miller, 2001, 380).  Through the mediation of MAS distant actions become visible 
and amenable to intervention. As a technology of governance the numbers in MAS 
are always already imbued with social significance as they render visible strategic 
and operational intentions and actions. As Miller argues:  
The calculative practices of [management] accounting are always intrinsically 
linked to a particular strategic or programmatic ambition. Accounting practices are 
endowed with a significance that goes beyond the task for which they are 
deployed. … it is through them that accounting comes to appear essential to the 
government of social and economic life.  Attention is thus drawn to the reciprocal 
relations between accountancy and the social relations it forms and seeks to 
manage. The calculative practices of accounting are intrinsically and irredeemably 
social.  
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If this is true, as it is so self-evidently for most managers, then MAS are at the very 
centre of governing the intentions, aspirations, beliefs, etc of many if not most 
organisational actors.  Given this organisational and social significance of MAS we 
would suggest that the question of the subjective engagement with numbers, as 
rendered possible by MAS, is fundamental to our understanding of how these 
systems actually govern organisational life, especially, we will argue, with regard 
to subjectivity. Not only with regard to the social construction of subjectivity as has 
been done for example by Miller & O’Leary (1987) and Hopwood (1987), but more 
importantly, with regards to subjective life itself through the affective experience of 
being confronted with a ‘numbered’ world.  This is the focus of our paper.  
 
We want to suggest that through information technology it has become possible 
for MAS to be deployed to govern the most intimate minutia of daily organisational 
life. Through an ever-increasing process of abstraction this has led to the 
progressive disembedding of the local singular and situated subject to a more 
globalised governed subject or agent.  However, ultimately decisions and actions 
have to return to the domain of the local singular and situated subject for them to 
be individually and socially significant.  It is in this regard that we believe 
phenomenology can and should play a role. We want to propose that through 
phenomenology, in particular the work of Husserl (1970) and Henry (1973, 1983, 
1998, 1999, 2003, 2004), we can give an account of the consequences of the 
‘mathematization’ of organisational life—and in particular the way individuals deal 
subjectively with this ‘mathematization’ in everyday organisational life as lived. We 
will show how phenomenology, specifically the work of Michel Henry, can help us 
     5
understand how actors live their lives in and through the simultaneity of systems of 
abstraction and their affective, embodied and situated living praxis.  
 
In order to do this we will structure the paper as follows. In the first section we set 
out the theoretical landscape within which our work is located. We draw on the 
work of social theorist Anthony Giddens(1984, 1990, and 1991), specifically his 
notion of time-space distanciation. We argue that this is a primary phenomenon for 
organisation studies and indicate how different authors have taken it up in their 
work as well as locate our work relative to it. In the second section we elaborate 
phenomenology, in particular the work of Husserl and Henry, as our theoretical 
horizon.  We suggest that ultimately all disembedding (through time-space 
distanciation and abstraction)  require, as an inescapable necessity,  individuals to 
re-embed, and even re-embody, abstract mathematical representations in order 
for these to be encountered as information—information as inward forming in the 
sense proposed by Boland (1984, 1987, 1993b) and others (Introna, 1997; Weick, 
1988, 1993, 1995). To support this argument we will present, in section three, the 
Omega case study of the implementation of a MAS. In reviewing this case study 
we will argue that abstract numbers are always perceived affectively as a 
supplementary and distinct mode of perception to vision and re-presentation. This 
review of the Omega case will be followed, in section four, with a discussion in 
which we clearly show how the affectedness of the individual managers condition 
their singular experience of abstract numbers in order for the MAS to have social 
significance, as argued by Miller (2001) and Jones & Dugdale (2001). In the final 
section we conclude that our contemporary understanding of the organisational 
reality of work—as increasingly mirrored in abstract systems of representations 
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(particularly IT mediated representations)—needs to take account of the insights 
provided by Henry’s phenomenology.  
2. Abstraction, time-space distanciation and the disembedding of 
the subject 
Abstraction2 is fundamental to achieving access and control across time-space 
boundaries or localities.  Through abstraction it is possible, in some particular way, 
to disembed the singularity—event, practice, individual, etc.—both with regard to 
time and space.  For example, with the aid of the abstraction that language 
provides one can refer to a person, a time, and a location, in a time and place 
other than that in which it occurs when it occurs as a singularity. It is possible, for 
example, for me to say “I saw Jim Smith yesterday at the university shop” and in 
so doing provide a certain type of access to that singularity (Jim and I at the 
university shop) to a third person who were not present in the singularity of the 
event.  Without this type of mediated access—made possible through the 
abstraction of language in this case—knowledge and agency will only be possible 
in the singularity of the event as such. One would need to be there in the 
singularity of the event, as and when it happens, as such, to know it or to control it 
in anyway whatsoever.  Thus, abstraction allows us to escape or transcend, in a 
very specific way, the specificity and embeddedness of the here and now.   
Giddens, time-space distanciation and the reflexive subject 
Giddens (1984, 1990, and 1991) calls this process of disembedding, through 
systems of abstraction, ‘time-space distanciation.’ Time-space distanciation, 
                                               
2
 By ‘abstraction’ we mean the process (or result) of generalization where the phenomena in 
question are reduced to some essential element seen as relevant (or useful) in a particular context. 
For example number, as an abstraction, reduces phenomena to be revealed as quantity.  Money, 
in the form of wages, reduces labour to an exchange value, and so forth.  
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according to him, allows us to lift out social activities from specific localized 
contexts and reorganise them across wider time-space horizons, or differently 
stated: it is “the conditions under which time and space are organized so as to 
connect presence and absence” (1990, 14, emphasis added).  This ever-
increasing interpenetration of presence and absence (through symbolic systems of 
abstraction, such as language, figures, money or information flows more generally) 
is, according to Giddens, a particular and distinctive feature of late modernity—
what he calls reflexive modernity.  In reflexive modernity “place becomes 
increasingly phantasmagoric – locales are penetrated by and shaped in terms of 
social influences quite distant from them” (19).   He also suggests that the 
essential aspects of time-space distanciation are expressed well through the 
notion of ‘globalisation’ where globalization is understood as “the intersection of 
presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations at a 
distance” (1991, 21)—see also Tomlinson (1999) for similar arguments.   Although 
many are critical of Giddens’ epochal analysis there is general agreement that his 
analysis of time-space distanciation identifies a very important modality of social 
organisation (irrespective of epoch)—and one might argue a modality central to 
the ongoing emergence of contemporary, increasingly global, organisations.  
 
As suggested above, time-space distanciation, through systems of abstraction, 
allows for the construction of the third person perspective (in our case the 
managerial perspective). Without this disembedding process, which abstraction 
makes possible, management as a third person perspective and information and 
communication technology as systems for the production and dissemination of 
abstractions would not have evolved to its current central position in organisational 
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discourse and practice.  Taylor, the father of modern management, understood 
this very well. In The Principles of Scientific Management (1911) he explains this 
movement from the embedded singularity to the development of abstract 
principles in order to manage and control work practices across time and space: 
To explain briefly: owing to the fact that the workmen in all of our trades have been 
taught the details of their work by observation of those immediately around them, 
there are many different ways in common use for doing the same thing… Now, 
among the various methods and implements used in each element of each trade 
there is always one method and one implement which is quicker and better than any 
of the rest. And this one best method and best implement can only be discovered or 
developed through a scientific study and analysis of all of the methods and 
implements in use, together with accurate, minute, motion and time study. This 
involves the gradual substitution of science for rule of thumb throughout the 
mechanic arts.   (pp 24-25, emphasis added)  
 
Through these ‘scientific’ abstractions a mode of action comes about that does not 
act directly and immediately on others (locally in the singularity) but instead acts 
upon their actions as rendered visible through these abstractions—i.e. governance 
at a distance, or more specifically governmentality, becomes possible (Foucault, 
1997).   
 
Through the scientific study, and codification, of work practices—as well as the 
automation and informatisation (Zuboff, 1989) of these practices through IT—there 
has been a massive intensification of the process of abstraction and with it 
unparalleled opportunity for time-space distanciation. The potential for time-space 
distanciation through information and communication technology was evidently 
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understood by those that marketed the early telephone as this AT&T 
advertisement from 1933 clearly demonstrates:    
A neighbor, passing by, glances through your window and sees you in the living-
room. But you are around the corner on Main Street, ordering from the druggist. You 
are in a nearby town chatting with a friend. You are in a distant city, delivering a 
message of cheer and assurance. You are across a continent, or an ocean, talking 
clearly and easily, as if distance had ceased to be. . . .   Your telephone is you. In a 
moment it multiplies and projects your personality to many different places and 
many different people, near or far. Part of your very self is in every telephone 
message – your thoughts, your voice, your smile, your words of welcome, the 
manner that is you. You use the telephone as you use the power of speech itself, to 
play your full part in the world of people. With it in your grasp, you are master of 
space and time. You are equal to emergency, ready of opportunity, receptive to 
ideas, equipped for action. The extraordinary fact is that the more you use your 
telephone, the more it extends your power and personality. (AT&T print 
advertisement, July 1933)   
 
The growth and development of management (as process and practices) is 
directly related to our ongoing ability to build systems for the production and 
dissemination of codified abstractions—i.e. for time-space distanciation.  Indeed, 
Giddens insists on the role initially played by mechanical devices such as clocks 
and maps to turn time and space into standardized entities removed from the 
immediacy of context (1990)—and to this we may also add ongoing digitization of 
work practices (such as CAD/CAM, ERP, GIS, etc.).  It is therefore not surprising 
that the scope and reach of management (as a process of governmentality) is 
directly connected with the ongoing development and dissemination of information 
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and communication technology. Through abstraction and codification action upon 
the actions of others itself becomes globalised.  Kalinikos (2006, p. 22) captures 
this idea well when he suggests that: “An expanding number of domains of 
palpable reality are carried, in surrogate forms, on the shoulders of technological 
informatization that describes, renders or constitutes, controls and monitors 
different aspects of social and institutional life. In thus making reality pliable and 
mobile, informatization has been an important precondition for the diffusion of 
alternative administrative models and work patterns.”      
 
Disembeding and distanciation through abstraction and codification is, however, 
just one side of the enactment of governmentality or one side of time-space 
distanciation.  Distanciation enables but it also constrains.  One might argue that 
the process of disembedding ultimately needs to be reembedded and localised in 
some way or another. The distanced organisational actors (managers and 
employees) need, in some way, to reembed, reembody or resituate the 
abstractions and codes they encounter in their information systems.  Without such 
a ‘reversal’ or retranslation the systems of abstraction—the MAS in our case—
would not function as a modality for governmentality.  In this regard Giddens 
(1990, p.86) suggests “facework rituals” as very important for individuals living in 
disembedded institutions to pin down distant relations to local conditions of time 
and space.  Face to face encounters are necessary to bracket distance and time, 
block off anxieties and organize reliable interactions across time-space. Giddens 
(1990) also acknowledges the fact that “trust in abstract systems is not 
psychologically rewarding in the way in which trust in a person is” (p.113) and 
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argues that there is a need to develop trust on a personal level. 3  Thus, time-space 
distanciation is a bidirectional phenomenon where presence and absence 
continually intertwine (or interpenetrate); as such it enables and constrains both 
autonomy and subjectivity.   
 
In conclusion, we would argue that although Giddens provides a compelling 
conceptual analysis of time-space distanciation, his high level analysis lacks 
empirical detail. In particular his analysis of the reflexive subject of late modernity 
does not provide an adequate account of how the living affected subject deals with 
the mutually interpenetrating simultaneity of presence (local, situated) and 
absence (global, abstract) as an ever-increasing fact of everyday contemporary 
life (across all social institutions). This is precisely the aim of our research reported 
here.    
Some existing studies on time-space distanciation  
It should be acknowledged that there are a large number of studies (and debates) 
within the IS and Organization Studies literature that has directly (or more 
indirectly) attempted to provide more detailed empirical studies of particular 
instances of technologically mediated time-space distanciation.   For example Jin 
and Robey (2008) have, in their study of iTalk, expanded Giddens’ analysis from 
social relations to technical artefacts/systems, more specifically, in order to show 
that these also require some form of reembedding to function appropriately. They 
argue that disembedding technologies in iTalk create new capabilities but also 
unexpected conflicts. They demonstrate that reembedding is highly situated. 
                                               
3
 Giddens quotes Deirdre Boden’s example of the academics who cross continents to attend 
conferences in order “to see the whites of the eyes of colleagues and enemies alike, to reaffirm 
and, more centrally, update the basis of trust” (1990, p.87). 
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Successful embedding of external interfaces resulted in problematic distant 
internal interfaces—thereby highlighting the social and technical conditions 
(especially the political aspect) that shape the reembedding of relations across 
time and space.   
 
More generally one could argue that time-space distanciation is perhaps one of 
the most central organisational phenomena for management and organisation 
studies.  As such it is possible to find many studies that attempt to account for it in 
more or less significant ways. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review all of 
these. We will however highlight a few strands of this work in order to locate our 
work.  For example, actor network theory (Walsham, 1999; Scott and Wagner, 
2003; Frandsen, 2009) deals with this phenomena by attempting to understand 
how technologically mediated actants enacts the global and abstract (safety 
regulations and intentions, for example) in the local practices (seat belts and 
ignition systems) in order to enrol local actors in distant programmes in more or 
less successful ways (Latour, 1992).    Others treat time-space distanciation as a 
problem of representation (Cooper, 1992; Kallinikos, 1995; Lilley et al., 2004, 
Townley, 1995). According to Lilley et al (2004) information technology in 
organisational settings functions to ‘re-present’ things (or render present that 
which was or is absent)—as such “their ‘natural’ presence is substituted by a 
technologically mediated presence elsewhere” (p.24). Another strand of research 
views time-space distanciation as a phenomenon (or problem) of virtualisation 
(Sotto, 1997; Schultze and Orlikowski, 2001; Robey, Schwaig, and Jin, 2003; 
Panteli, 2004). For example Introna (2001) argues that virtualisation will always be 
constrained by the situated and embedded nature of social practices.  Similarly, 
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Robey et al (2003) show, in their study of virtual teamwork, that presence and 
absence needs to be intertwined sufficiently for meaningful distanciated 
collaborative practices to exist.   Finally, and most relevant to us, is the way in 
which presence and absence conditions ongoing interpretation and sense making 
in conditions of time-space distanciation (Boland, 1983b, 1991 and 1993a; Weick, 
1988, 1995).   
 
Boland and Weick were among the first to focus explicitly on the problem of 
interpretation and sense-making as it emerged in managers (and employees) 
having to deal with the problem of increasingly encountering the action (of others 
that they are concerned with) through systems of abstraction and codification.  In 
their critique of the process of abstraction and codification (or mathematization) 
Boland (1983b) suggested that our systems of abstraction and codification did not 
contain ‘information’ since the very essence of information already implies a 
subject that is inwardly formed. In other words our supposedly ‘informing’ systems 
through its abstraction and codification had already in some way disembedded or 
lost its subject (or more precisely its subjectivity). He further showed that when 
managers encountered supposedly ‘objective’ accounting information they will 
always implicitly reembed these abstractions and reimbue them with subjective life 
through a process of ongoing, mostly implicit, interpretation (Boland, 1993b). His 
work explicitly and implicitly connected to the more general philosophical debates 
on the problem of interpretation or hermeneutics as reflected, for example, in the 
work of Dilthey and Gadamer (Palmer, 1969).   Boland’s work and others that have 
followed this line of inquiry (Boland & Pondy, 1983a; Thomson et al., 1989; 
Dreyfus, 1991; Introna, 1997; Gabriel, 2002; Ciborra, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004) 
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brought the problem of the subject (or subjectivity), and the embodied subject 
(Mingers, 2001) that these systems of abstraction and codification had in some 
sense ‘lost or forgotten’ back into consideration. More specifically it brought the 
problem of the ongoing perceptual engagement of the subject in an increasingly 
abstract and globalised world into focus. With this move phenomenology emerged 
as an important resource for understanding the subjectivity of the subject in 
dealing with informatized abstractions.4 Unfortunately, due to the technical 
language of phenomenology these very fruitful early attempts never found its way 
into the mainstream research of accounting and information systems.   In the next 
section we want to recover some of these origins in order to show that they are still 
very relevant and necessary to account for the ‘distanced’ and governed subject at 
the centre of every MAS. 
3. Phenomenology, mathematization and being affected  
In this section we want to show that phenomenology, in the work of Husserl, can 
give an account of the mathematization of the lifeworld more generally, and that 
phenomenology, in the work of Henry, can help us to understand how individual 
actors become affected by these systems of abstraction and codification in the 
lifeworld of ongoing everyday organisational life.  In a first instance we want to 
show, with Husserl, that the mathematization of organisations has emerged in 
management practice, and more specifically in MAS, as part of a broader history 
of ideas and practices which both enabled and legitimated it.  After that we will 
introduce the phenomenology of Henry which enables us to articulate 
                                               
4
  Phenomenology has also been identified by non phenomenologist as a central complement to 
their frameworks. Indeed, a chapter in Giddens’ book The consequences of modernity (1990) is 
dedicated to a ‘Phenomenology of modernity’ (p.137). This chapter deals with the mediation at a 
distance between intimate relationships and the sense of familiar though abstract systems.  
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organisational actors’ embodied lived experience and the way they deal with 
abstract representations through interpretation as suggested by Boland (1984; 
1987).  
Husserl and the mathematization of knowledge and action 
In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936 
translated 1970) Husserl traces back to Galileo the emergence of a “theoretical 
logical praxis” disconnected from “our bodily way of living” (50).  According to 
Husserl, “Immediately with Galileo, then, begins the surreptitious substitution of 
idealized nature for prescientifically intuited nature” (1970: 49-50).  Knowledge is 
no longer bound to the uniqueness of situations, but sees the world through a 
prism of idealized forms and geometric models. The lifeworld, the world which we 
perceive subjectively through our senses, is substituted for a world of geometric 
and mathematical forms, which is now perceived as the original and legitimate life-
world. This theory of knowledge also gives rise to a specific theory of action. 
Instead of the real praxis – one concerned with empirical reality, we are now faced 
with an ideal praxis, “of ‘pure thinking’ which remains exclusively within the realm 
of pure limit-shapes” (1970: 26).  
If one has the formulae, one already possesses, in advance, the practically desired 
prediction of what is to be expected with empirical certainty in the intuitively given 
world of concretely actual life, in which mathematics is merely a special form of 
praxis.(1970: 43).  
 
Thanks to this prediction and anticipation, made possible by mathematics, the 
ideal action can be carried into real life. The perfect nature of this type of action is 
justified by the exactness of the calculation—i.e. we can know for certain.  As we 
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have suggested above through the ‘exactness’ of numbers, and the distributive 
capacity of information technology, MAS provides the users with a supposed 
confidence to act according to the abstract optimized efficiency of this new limit-
shape (see also Hummel, 2006). It locates the question of exactness in the 
mathematical calculations and, in doing this, constitutes subjectively lived 
experience as potentially in ‘error.’ As Brunsson (2006) puts it “the [abstract 
rational] principle shows that the reality is wrong rather than the reverse. The 
practice is wrong, then, because it does not follow the principle” (115).  However, 
as Husserl points out, the logical consequence of this perspective is that it leaves 
no room for life.  
In his view of the world from the perspective of geometry, the perspective of what 
appears to the senses and is mathematizable, Galileo abstracts from the subjects as 
persons leading a personal life; he abstracts from all that is in any way spiritual, from 
all cultural properties which are attached to things in human praxis (1970: 60). 
 
We would suggest that Husserl’s analysis of the mathematization of the life-world 
shows very clearly the cultural-historical context in which scientific management as 
well as the technology of MAS, as a mode of governmentality, emerged as entirely 
legitimate, even necessary.  In such a cultural-historical context it would not be 
surprising for idealised limit-shapes (in the form of cost data provided by the MAS) 
to become the privileged ‘exact’ reality that displaces the intuitive experience of 
the life-world and generates what Hummel (2006) calls the mismeasures of 
management. If this is the case then one might ask how it is possible to account 
for the way organizational members live (or not) their intuitive and subjective 
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experience of life-world and their experience of numbers? To answer this question 
we propose that we turn to the phenomenology of Henry.  
Henry’s phenomenology   
The fundamental thesis of Henry’s phenomenology, as predominantly expressed 
in The Essence of Manifestation (1963; translated 1973), was to argue for two 
distinct but intertwined modalities of perception of phenomena.  The first modality, 
very familiar to us, was ‘seeing’ or perceiving the objects at a distance, in which 
case objects appear to us in the light of our intentional behaviour; or merely during 
the course of actions we are engaged in.  MAS are, as we have suggested above, 
a technology to make objects of interest appear to us at a distance through 
mathematical representations. It creates meaning by placing actual results under 
the light of some intentional expectations and/or previous achievements. The 
second modality of perceiving, of which we are mostly unaware, is affectivity or 
affectedness. In Henry’s phenomenology the emphasis is on the fact that our living 
body, being an affective body (flesh in his terms), is the source of another form of 
knowledge that is entirely different from the one that comes to us through 
representations. In the whole spectrum between, tough or pleasant effort, or 
between joy and suffering, affectivity or affectedness leaves no distance between 
us and our affective perceptions.  It is wholly immanent, in Henry’s terms.  
 
Affectivity or affectedness is not only supplementary to the ‘seeing’ of objects but it 
is also distinct from it as an always inescapable mode of perception. In other 
words, as incarnate beings, there is no way for us not to be affected.  Thus, with 
Henry, we would claim that abstract numbers and other representations are not 
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only perceived cognitively but always also affectively.  Indeed we have all 
experienced that ‘good’ or ‘bad’ numbers or figures truly affect us in the flow of 
everyday life. However, we are not affected because they are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, 
rather, experiencing them as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ already presupposes our 
affectedness.5  In proposing Henry’s account of the duplicity of perception, 
especially our affectedness, we are not trying to argue for the role of emotions or 
feelings in reason, as has been done in many recent and useful contributions 
(such as for example the work of Damasio (1994)).  We are rather claiming, more 
radically, that affectedness is the inescapable condition of being human. Indeed, it 
is the very possibility of human experience as such (Henry, 1963; translated 
1973).  
 
In their work Boland (1993b) and Boland and Pondy (1983b) have argued that the 
ongoing situated lived experience of the individual is already implied in any 
interpretive or sense making process.  It seems likely that Henry would agree with 
Boland in stressing the necessary engagement of lived experience in the 
interpretation of abstractions. However, he would further argue, that dealing with 
abstractions is not only an interpretative problem—in the sense of creating an 
appropriate representation or framing (through cognitive scheme, culture, 
language, etc.).  He would suggest that such interpretive process is also 
intertwined with subjective life, which is affectively lived through the inescapable 
and various affects of effort, pain, joy, etc.   
 
                                               
5
 Embodied affectedness, as Henry suggests, is the way our life manifests itself to ourselves—what 
he calls auto-affection. 
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We want to propose that this connection between the interpretation of 
representations and affective perception has not yet been adequately accounted 
for in organization studies (Linstead and Westwood, 2001). We would argue that 
from the very beginning affectedness is already implied in the perception of lived 
experience as such—without it lived experience would not be ‘lived’.   
Affectedness constitutes the conditions of possibility of lived experience and lived 
experience constitutes the conditions of possibility of any interpretive or sense 
making activity to be meaningful as proposed by Boland (1984,1987) and Weick 
(1988, 1995) amongst others. Henry’s phenomenology also helps us go one step 
further.  It allows us to grasp the way individuals relate to the world of idealised 
shapes (which Husserl identified) and to their subjective life simultaneously.  
 
Let us take for example the experience of exceeding a target expressed in 
numerical limit-shape (such as a sales budget).  We might experience the 
excitement of seeing our performance exceed expectations but we also often 
simultaneously and paradoxically find ourselves overwhelmed by a sense of 
malaise. Why is this simultaneity?  When figures are far better than expected the 
excitement comes from the positive difference between the figure x (horizon of 
expectation) and figure y (achievement). In the light of the horizon of expectation 
this difference seems exciting. However, often a sense of malaise immediately 
emerges as we experience the gap between the reduction/abstraction the figures 
represent—as idealised limit-shapes—on the one hand, and our affective 
perception of the lived situation on the other hand.  To focus on the abstract 
figures alone would be to attempt to silence our inescapable condition of living as 
a being that is affected. Thus, in our example, the malaise comes from the attempt 
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to hide, through mathematical reductions, what appears in the light of our affective 
life.  This malaise is especially reinforced when we have had to experience the 
‘destructive moves’ or the very painful efforts that might be necessary to reach 
such ‘excellent results’.  Thus, going a step further, we will suggest that Henry will 
enable us to get a deeper understanding of malaise, as experienced by subjects in 
a landscape of abstract codifications.  
 
Let us also stress with Henry that the being of being human means ultimately to 
experience ourselves affectively as being alive.6  From this foundation Henry 
argues that, as living beings, we are all inhabited by the dynamism of development 
and expansion of our embodied affective life—what he calls our teleology of life.7  
In the teleology of life pain, malaise and suffering emerge as that which opposes 
the dynamism of one’s affective life.  In Henry’s view, our everyday action should 
be considered, first and foremost, as a manifestation of one’s living praxis—as an 
ongoing fully immanent subjective experience of effort, joy and suffering8 
according to one’s own singularity. Thus, the horizon of one’s living praxis9 is 
intertwined but totally different from the expanding world of objective knowledge or 
representation—what one might call the teleology of abstraction. According to 
Henry this living praxis, internally informed and empowered by the teleology of 
                                               
6
 “In the immanence of its own pathos, the reality of life…. is everything except what 
contemporaneous thought will turn it into, that is, some impersonal, anonymous, blind, mute 
essence. In itself the reality of life bears necessarily this Self” (Henry, 1999: 353) 
7
 Henry is here very close to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Macyntire. They argue—
against the philosophies which claimed the superior power of the intellect—that affective life is the 
dynamic principle of knowledge, intelligence and action. 
8
 In Henry’s view action is not to be first considered, from the outside, as a process; nor, in an 
Hegelian way, as an exteriorisation of our subjectivity 
9
 With ‘living praxis’ Henry (1983) means: “Praxis designates the internal structure of action as it 
excludes from itself the objectification process, all distancing, all transcendence in general. What is 
held to be real, consequently, will be ... whatever experiences itself immediately ... What is real, 
therefore is need, hunger, suffering, labour too...”   (p. 160)  
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one’s life, is achieved through cultural, spiritual or ethical praxis which enables 
different ways of experiencing the good life. Such living praxis is fully assured—as 
in giving full confidence—since it is never divorced from itself (and from what 
empowers it). Hence, the experience of malaise can then be understood as the 
expression of a gap between the teleology of abstraction, and one’s teleology of 
life.10 
 
How might individuals respond to this experience? Henry suggests that although 
our lived experience is always to some degree determined by the structural 
conditions we find ourselves in—and MAS is one such structural condition—we 
are first and foremost already in the teleology of our affective life.  Malaise, pain, 
joy is already a critical standpoint necessary to overdetermine these structuring 
determinations. Given this primacy of the teleology of live, and the privileging of 
the teleology of abstraction in contemporary organisational life, one may ask: how 
do managers and controllers live affectively with this simultaneity of the teleology 
of their life and the teleology of abstraction?  How do they, in the singularity of their 
affective living, overdetermine it (or not)?   
 
In the next section we will look at the Omega case study to reveal some of their 
ways of dealing with this simultaneity. It is our claim that Henry’s phenomenology 
will enable us to give a more subtle and detailed account of the re-embedding 
process through “reciprocal relations between accountancy and the social 
relations it forms and seeks to manage” Miller (2001, 380).   
                                               
10
 When money is fetishized and/or when one manages only through mathematical figures, in line 
with a theoretical logical praxis, then the MAS and the actions it aims to engender may be 
interpreted as a way to stand for, or to deny, the very dynamism of the praxis of living beings.  
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4. Living with MAS: The Case of Omega  
In our case study we will show employees of a company Omega share 
representations of common interest using a Management Accounting System 
(MAS). While they all acknowledge the usefulness of the system, they are all 
deeply affected by the discrepancies between the formal representations they use 
on the MAS and their own lived experience. Then, how do they, through the 
dynamism of their own affective life, subjectively make sense of their experience 
(cf. Boland and Weick)?  How do they re-embed the system and the distant social 
ties it creates (cf. Giddens)?  From our analysis of the interview data we will 
attempt to answer these questions by outlining three different subjective ways 
(amongst others) of ‘living with the MAS’ (as an imperfect but shared system of 
representations)—the political, incarnate, and negotiation way.  However, before 
we proceed with this analysis and discussion we will offer some comments on our 
research methodology and provide some background to our case study.  
Some comments on methodology 
Phenomenology is mostly perceived as a research method (Creswell, 1997) used 
by a growing number of authors in organization studies (e.g. Van Mannen, 2002) 
and IS (e.g. Zuboff, 1989, Brigham and Introna, 2006, Whitley and Myers, 2002). 
This paper uses phenomenology as a theoretical framework (the work of Husserl 
and Henry discussed above) but also as a methodology. Indeed, we would argue 
that theory and method are intimately connected and cannot be separated. In 
other words we would argue that it is not possible to take a phenomenological 
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approach to research and then not giving a phenomenological account of it.  As 
such it was important for us also to reflect Henry’s phenomenology in our research 
methodology—by this we mean to acknowledge the singular nature of affective 
subjective experience. Accordingly we did not look at Henry’s phenomenology (or 
phenomenology in general) to provide us with ‘patterns’ or coding schema that 
would function to systemise our data collection or analysis—unfortunately this is 
often done with so-called ‘phenomenological’ data (Thomson, et al., 1989, 1990)   
The interviews 
In the spring of 2004 one of the authors spent a two months period immersed at 
Omega’s head office to conduct research on management accounting practices 
and governance. Omega executives welcomed this study on the ground that they 
had implemented new financial reporting tools some time ago and were of the 
view that they needed an analysis of the present situation prior to undertaking 
further developments. The researcher was completely at ease with management 
control vocabulary, practices, techniques and instruments since he could build on 
his own two year experience as a management controller in the headquarters of a 
large French multinational company. Most of his time at Omega’s headquarters 
was spent immersed with the management accounting team and several trips to 
Paris and Lyon airports were organised to interview sales managers and visit 
subsidiaries’ offices, local sales points, and warehouses. Thirty four people were 
interviewed (see list in Appendix). Interviews (all extensively transcribed) were 
semi-structured and would typically last between 1 and 2 hours. The interview 
typically started with questions on the interviewees’ contribution to budgeting and 
forecasting exercises before taking a more informal turn.  All questions were open-
     24
ended in order to develop a “sym-pathetic” presence.  The respondents were not 
only given the opportunity to speak about their work with regard to the MAS they 
were also encouraged to express their affective experience (through questions 
such as “how did you feel when....”  One might say that the interviews were open-
ended dialogues rather than specific questions that expected specific responses. 
In these open-ended dialogues subjective affective responses were treated as 
equally legitimate to rational or cognitive responses—utmost care was taken not to 
privilege the one over the other, to allow the interviewee to move from the one to 
the other as they felt appropriate.   
Co-generative analysis of the interviews 
The approach to data collection was only one element of our phenomenological 
approach. The data analysis was also inspired by Henry’s phenomenology. Over 
the course of several months two of the authors had a regular dialogue based on 
extracts from the interviews.  We initially selected extracts from the interviews that 
seem to express the duplicity of abstraction and affectivity as described by the 
interviewees of their daily work with the MAS at Omega.  During these first 
readings we were cautious not to simply impose Henry’s ‘phenomenological 
categories’ onto the accounts.  It was important for our phenomenological analysis 
not to reduce singular lived experiences to the ideal limit shapes of our intellectual 
categories.  The multiple readings were guided by a principle of fidelity that 
allowed the text (interviewee) to retain its (their) singular voice.   
 
Initially we expected to become aware of the negative impact of the abstract world 
of the MAS as it impinged on the lived experience of the participants. However, we 
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soon realised that this was a much too simplistic view of the data.  In subsequent 
readings we worked with the hypothesis (or rather intuition) that different lived-
experiences may be related to different roles within the organisation. But we soon 
discovered that this was not the case. We did however notice that a certain 
coherence of experience seem to have emerged between different ‘couples’ of 
actors.  It might have been possible to create a taxonomy of different ‘types’ but 
we resisted this and instead adopted the notion of different ‘ways’ (or modes of 
living). We deliberately focused on only a few such ways (many more were 
possible).  Thus all extracts of interviews presented below come from the 
testimonies of nine (9) individuals with different, very singular, lived experiences.  
The selection of these individuals and ‘ways of doing’ makes no claim to any 
universal essence apart from the fact that all respondents were affected in 
different but also somewhat similar ways.   Thus, the entire analysis phase was 
conducted in the form of a co-generative dialogue (Depraz, 2003) in which there 
was a co-generative interplay between the theoretical horizon (Henry’s 
phenomenology) and the narratives of the interviewees (their singular lived 
experience).11  In this ongoing dialogue there was never a subordination of the one 
over the other. Rather they vitalised each other to bring about new understanding 
and insight as to the meaning of living with abstract numbers. 
 
Clearly Henry’s phenomenology is not the only theoretical horizon worthy of 
application to the case.  We would argue, nonetheless, that is seems to provide us 
with original insights—on the intertwining of the absence and presence—without 
                                               
11
 The two discourses with their own validity claim may develop in a ‘co-generative’ way if they are 
allowed to empower each other reciprocally. However, the horizon of such co-generative dialog is 
living praxis, which places a limit on any speculation. 
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overloading us with analytical categories, as we hope will be apparent from our 
discussion below.  
Some background on Omega  
Omega is a subsidiary of a multinational company listed on the Paris Stock 
Exchange. It has specialized in travel retail, selling products such as perfume, 
cosmetics, spirits and tobacco in shops located in airport terminals. Omega runs 
over 100 sales points at French airports and employs about 1 200 collaborators. 
For each airport terminal, Omega has appointed an operational manager who, as 
far as budgets and financial results are concerned, works with a management 
controller based at the headquarters.  All airport terminals share a common MAS 
used to forecast future activities and report actual results to the headquarters.  
Forecasting is a particularly important budgeting exercise. Four times a year, all 
managers are asked to estimate their future sales over the coming 12 months. 
Simultaneously, management controllers work on expected costs. All the data is 
then collected and processed into the MAS to obtain an overall picture of expected 
profits.   
The importance of MAS in Omega   
As in most retail companies, every Omega employee is focused on the “Sales per 
Passenger” ratio (SPP).12  Operational managers tend to somehow ‘translate’ their 
intuitive knowledge of situations into SPP ratios that contribute to the mathematical 
representations of the future. At the time of the study, figures collected from 
operational managers were processed using the new MAS that had been in use 
                                               
12
 The SPP ratio being the average amount spent in Omega shops or outlets per passenger. 
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for approximately two years. The MAS proved to be very helpful to controllers from 
the headquarters who communicate actual results and estimates every trimester to 
investors and shareholders who are therefore provided with permanently updated 
projections against which to evaluate actual achievements.  All “discrepancies” 
between forecasts and actual sales at a terminal are then likely to be precisely 
attributed either to changes in traffic - for which Omega is largely dependent on 
the airlines and the airport company - or to changes in the SPP - for which sales 
people and managers are held responsible. Thus, corporate managers find 
themselves in a position where they, through the MAS, have mediated access to 
local knowledge, i.e. to overcome their time-space distanciation by ‘lifting out’ the 
operational activities from their specific localized contexts. One of the 
consequences of this explicit and permanent comparison between actual results 
and expected ones is to turn the forecasts into the basis for wide-ranging incentive 
programmes central to most rewards and blame policies in the company. 
 
What we find is that the ‘forecast’ is looked at very differently from the perspective 
of the different actors involved. Boardroom managers tend to share the practice 
and expectation of working on abstract representations of the firm’s activities, 
rather than on the activities themselves—i.e. to govern at a distance. They do this 
in a context of a wide range of often conflicting priorities. They are struggling to cut 
down costs and inventories, increase profits, allocate resources in the best 
possible way, and to secure the shareholders’ long-term commitment. As such 
forecasts need to reflect Omega’s potential growth and to satisfy shareholders’ 
expectations. Thus, the forecasts represent an amalgamation of possibilities and 
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expectations in which each are shaped by the other. For example, some estimates 
proposed by controllers and operational managers might be considered either too 
optimistic or too conservative bearing in mind the expectations of the financial 
markets. In practice, as it is often the case, top managers change the figures in 
order to satisfy the shareholder’s dominant view of what ‘good management’ is 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985) i.e. to deliver, year after year, steadily increasing 
profits.   
“To me, good forecasts are the ones that meet the shareholders’ expectations and 
that are consistent with the company’s strategy in terms of costs and profits 
perspectives”.(Barry, CEO) 
In contrast to this, operational managers are first and foremost faced with 
unexpected events such as changes in flight schedules, refurbishments of sales 
points, employee absences, and so on and so forth. To them, forecasts are only 
the best possible representations of future possible outcomes which are highly 
dependent on unforeseeable events. Yet, it is the MAS and its combination of 
actual figures and forecasts that will determine their contribution. 
 
All information flowing from an operational level to boardroom management is 
‘translated’ into memos and reporting charts on screens and on paper by 
controllers. Controllers are the only human interface between top managers and 
operational managers.  Focusing on the controllers’ work experience and on those 
of their counterparts (operational managers) in the terminal, we will now present 
the different “lived experiences” that are characteristic of the work relationships 
between controllers, operational managers and MAS. 
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Living with the teleology of abstraction and one’s teleology of life  
A political experience of working with MAS 
Muriel (Controller 1) has been in her present position for more than 3 years now. 
When describing her activities, she immediately stresses the differences in 
objectives among the different people involved in the forecast process. She sees 
herself as being involved in “a political game” between people with different, 
essentially utilitarian, behaviours. She explicitly mentions that both top managers 
and local managers have opposite interests: top management’s intention is to 
show ambitious forecasts to shareholders, while local managers favour 
conservative forecasts to increase their chances of over-performing and getting 
bonuses. Muriel mentions that operational managers anticipate and make 
calculations that are likely to minimize their forecasts to make sure that, even if the 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) increases it a little, they can still meet the target in 
the end.  
“The operational staff's view isn't always the same as Finance's view because they 
don’t have the same goals. We have to act as middle-men: we need to have a 
more objective view on the business because they get a bonus which is determined 
by the budget…” (Muriel, Controller 1) 
On the other hand, she expects top management to be aware of this anticipatory 
behaviour of operational managers. Thus, she would tend not to change the 
operational forecast proposals as she anticipates the fact that the top managers 
will support their own agenda by proposing optimistic but uncertain expectations.  
“To find the right balance we know that some operational managers are very 
pessimistic so we get them to go up. Optimists are a rare breed but CFOs are very 
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optimistic. We virtually have to let the pessimists be pessimistic so that the CFO will 
bring them up.“ (Muriel, Controller 1) 
Thus, according to her these anticipatory calculations make her controllers’ job 
particularly difficult.  
“The amendments are usually purely political: we can’t whitewash the facts when 
results are bad. But we try to remain optimistic when times are hard (…) if we hope 
that, say, price changes will work in our favour, we increase the revenue a bit. It’s 
not an operational modification but a strategic one. But in the end I’m the one who 
changes the sales figures and everything has to be changed at the last minute – 
we’re thrilled about that (sarcastic)” (Muriel, Controller 1) 
Because top management interferes with the forecasts to limit differences between 
forecasts and the expectations of the financial market, she feels deprived of her 
role of interpreting and appreciating the proposals of the operational managers. 
She therefore complains about having to merely accept the amendments of top 
management without having a say in the matter.  
“Sometimes I prepare something for the budget and they do things differently, and 
sometimes I don’t agree and in that case I become very detached from what I’ve 
done.”  (Muriel, Controller 1) 
She limits excessive movements, either way, as much as possible without any real 
cooperation from anyone. She further suggests that in this “game” the operational 
managers do not mobilize their knowledge of local contingencies to support their 
forecasts as they have no faith in their ability to affect the decisions of top 
managers. She feels therefore that she has no relevant information to report from 
the field to the higher levels of management. Operational managers tend to accept 
any changes imposed on them from above without defending their position: they 
adopt a loyal but fatalistic attitude. 
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“Our role as an interface between the operational managers and Finance is to 
smooth things over. If the budget is too low and they (top management) mess up, 
they’re (operational managers) happy, and if it’s higher, well, they’re used to it now 
and they just give up.” (Muriel, Controller 1) 
 
An incarnated experience of working with MAS 
Mike (Controller 2) joined Omega some 18 months ago after a first few years’ 
experience as a financial controller in the air travel business. He is now in charge 
of Omega’s largest airport terminal where Mark (Ops. Manager 2) is in charge of 
all the Spirits and Tobacco shops. Mike bases his forecasting on strong and clear 
principles. He advocates the idea that the forecast must take into account local 
contingencies instead of blanket adjustments. 
“Our aim is to use the data in a realistic way that is consistent with overall economic 
targets. The method is clear and open, with plenty of room for dialogue. But last 
time, after the operational manager’s proposal, we had to make a few quick overall 
corrections which weren’t realistic for the sales outlets. If we make too many 
corrections, we get lost.” (Mike, Controller 2) 
 
Having no previous experience in retail, he tends to have very direct relationships 
with the operational managers he works with, and he seizes every opportunity to 
spend time with them on site.  
“I work directly with the (…) operational managers mainly. It’s a team effort and we 
rely on one another a great deal (…) I try to go to the airport once a month to visit 
the shops, give them a hand setting up. Next Tuesday a remodelled shop is 
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opening, so everyone’s coming to lend a hand moving, which will be a good way of 
getting to know everyone as well as the sales outlet.” (Mike, Controller 2) 
 
Mike does not hesitate to challenge the accuracy and fairness of the SPP formula 
and to suggest modifications to it. It is a well-known fact among operational 
managers that not all the shops are located in the same part of the terminals and 
this has an impact on SPP levels. Some sales points are right in front of customs 
whilst others are tucked away in corners. Mike managed to learn from Mark and 
succeeded in showing top management the link between different SPP levels and 
the position of sales points.  Although this effort did not change the SPP formula it 
did contribute to a better understanding of the figures by the top management. As 
a direct result they started to lobby airport management to get access to better 
locations instead of simply blaming poor results on operational management.  
 
This way of knowing from experience and doing “face-work” with colleagues is 
totally shared by Mark (Ops. Manager 2), who claims to pay a lot of attention to 
face-to-face communication at work. 
“We use e-mail a lot - at the expense of interpersonal skills, and that’s an 
understatement  (…) I’m one of those managers who believes that it’s people who 
make up the system (…) Man is at the heart of the system: he’s the one who 
optimises it - or not, as the case may be. The system should be adapted to suit the 
people who make it work. (…) E-mails can be handy but I prefer face-to-face 
communication by far. Via e-mail we communicate about anything and everything: 
it’s dangerous. We delegate without control. I hate e-mail (…) I like to meet people, I 
see them, I visit the shop, we talk about this and that and that’s how I build up my 
business. Management is all about people.” (Mark, Ops. Manager 2) 
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With this common way of living and working, Mike and Mark develop cooperation 
via regular informal contact and face-to-face meetings. Consequently when top 
management change the forecast without notification, he expresses how he is 
really affected.  
“Naturally, when we spend time putting together a realistic budget we’re not thrilled 
when it’s all changed (irony). When people ask us to be more optimistic we have no 
choice, we just get on with it. We don’t have any qualms about it, we say: “ooh dear, 
it’s going to be tough” because we thought the first version was the right one but we 
do it. (…) We can change (forecasts) for reasons of strategy or future possibilities or 
God knows what - I don't even want to know13 but (…) we keep quiet and just take it 
because it’s our job.” (Mark, Ops. Manager 2) 
 
In these situations Mark is forced to abandon his situated knowledge and stay 
loyal to his company even though he may suffer from goals set up from above, 
which are disconnected from his and his team lived reality. 
 
Negotiating reality through MAS 
It has also been three years since Janet (Controller 3) started her job at Omega. 
She says that she has developed quite close relationships with operational 
managers in that time. She is well aware of the problems related to the abstract 
dimension of her job and thus makes a point of having regular face-to-face contact 
with operational managers to keep herself abreast of their precise problems.  
                                               
13
  In French : « ou de je ne sais quoi et je ne veux pas le savoir »  
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"There is an operational side to this job, because even though we do spend days on 
end poring over figures, we see the buyers and the operational managers and so 
are still involved at an operational level, which means we’re not just dealing with 
abstract ideas all day. We’re required to be very independent in our particular area 
and find out exactly why things aren’t going well.” (Janet, Controller 3) 
 
During the forecast process, she is nonetheless well aware of the fact that she is 
under the authority of top managers who have their own constraints to be 
incorporated into the forecasts. She sets up the requirements from top 
management within which some sort of negotiation with operational managers can 
develop.  
“In these negotiations we do have some influence because I tell the managers that it 
won’t work because you need to be higher than the original forecast [...] It’s easy to 
know what [top] management wants and so we lean towards their way of thinking 
and they [the operational managers] put a stop to that because things can get a little 
tough when we start off pretty high.…” (Janet, Controller) 
 
In this negotiation process she gives her operational managers the opportunity to 
justify their local decisions to top management from their real life context. 
“To prepare my forecasts I mention that my terminal will be refurbished. I also 
mention that last year we had the war in Iraq and so on. I write a whole list on a 
sheet of paper with all the important elements such as the move of the Tel Aviv flight 
to another terminal explaining a loss of so many Euros with an impact on the SPP of 
so much. I also mention that the double labelling (duty free or not) will have such an 
impact on sales (…) I also mention that with less flights to care about, my team will 
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have more time to take care of my clients who need information” (Judith, Ops. 
Manager 3) 
 
Helping managers to elaborate the figures from their specific and situated context 
is also a way to help them to use the figures when they need to argue with their 
directors. In this way she is perceived as a partner by the operational managers 
she works with. 
“If we go way over I call my director to explain that – let’s say – that with the mobile 
perfume shop, I had to hire a few more temps and that’s really exciting for the table 
– we didn’t use to have that. It’s interesting to see what room for manoeuvre he has. 
We look at all the costs.” (Judith, Ops. Manager 3) 
  
Another way she manages the negotiation process is to propose specific 
improvement projects which will make it possible for the unit to meet the forecasts. 
“It’s really interesting because we have an operation going with Financial Control 
and Purchasing to increase sales as quickly as possible and it has an immediate 
impact on the Profit and Loss account and the other tools. We set targets in the 
shops in order to budget in particular areas.” (Judith, Ops. Manager 3) 
 
In spite of all her efforts Janet is not always in a position to prevent last-minute 
changes. She suffers as much as the operational managers from these top-down 
decisions which often prevents her from doing meaningful follow up of actual 
results.  Living praxis is then subordinated to what appears as abstract 
imperatives. 
“There are so many people that can modify the figures without asking me. If only we 
would stick to the figures decided with the operational manager, we would really 
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have a close look at the differences between actual figures and forecasts but now…” 
(Janet, Controller 3). 
 
Now that we have looked at these three different responses to ‘living with abstract 
numbers’ (and there are many more) we would suggest that these experiences are 
not just minor idiosyncratic differences but rather singular significant differences as 
revealed by Michel Henry’s phenomenology.  Let us consider them in more detail. 
 
5. Discussion: Re-embedding MAS while being affected 
One might be tempted to say that senior managers live in the ‘unreal’ world of 
abstraction and operational managers live in the real world of everyday reality. 
One might also add that it is the complicated problem for the controllers to try and 
reconcile (or translate) between these two different worlds—i.e. the classical role 
of middle management. Such a more ‘dualistic’ account can and has been done 
before (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Mintzberg, 1994). However, it would be our 
argument that such an account, although not incorrect as such, would tend to miss 
uncovering the more subtle, but very significant, lived experiences that Henry’s 
phenomenology will allow us to account for in the not unfamiliar organizational 
context of MAS in Omega.   
 
From this phenomenological perspective we would claim that all the actors (at all 
levels) are deeply affected, in a very profound way, by the world they encounter—
in and through the abstractions of the MAS and by their embodied lived 
experience at the same time. They are all trying—to greater or lesser degree—to 
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make the abstractions reflect (rather than deny) their own affective subjective 
reality—living at the same time with both the teleology of abstraction and the 
teleology of their life. If this was not the case then the MAS would not be the 
powerful social technology that it self-evidently is for the actors in the case, and 
has been argued by Miller (2001) and Miller and O’Leary (1993).  For us it is 
important to reveal the variety of ways in which all the actors try to live this 
simultaneity.  We will show how phenomenology will allow us to become aware of 
this simultaneity without simply turning such an account itself into another limit-
shape or abstraction. This is obviously an ever present danger for all accounts 
(indeed for all accounting more generally).   
 
Thus, we start by acknowledging that all the actors are affected, even determined, 
by the MAS in very specific and singular ways. As Henry suggest: “it is therefore 
exact to ascertain that social determinations [such as the MAS] “determine” the 
individual to its innermost beings… and that determination consists in the fact that 
they are lived, felt, experienced (éprouvées in French) by every individual” (Henry, 
1990: 104-105 our translation).  Henry’s phenomenology gives us good reason to 
acknowledge, and underline, the singularity of every respondent’s affectedness. 
As proposed by Henry, “differences that arise from the irreducible individuality of a 
living subjectivity are entirely different from social differences” (Henry, 1990: 105, 
our own translation).  If we take this seriously we can avoid simply reducing these 
individual differences to ‘types’.  Nevertheless, within the context of the irreducible 
nature of individual subjectivity we might still be able to discern or suggest, to 
some degree at least, some ‘similarities’ in these experiences—one might say 
different ways of dealing with this simultaneity.  
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We would suggest that all the actors are acutely aware that the abstract numbers 
in the MAS will move across the boundaries of time and space—in other words we 
would say that actors in contemporary organisations have become reflexively 
aware of the ongoing working out of time-space distanciation (as suggested by 
Giddens). They anticipate that these numbers will become seen by others at a 
different time in a different place within a different praxis. They anticipate that 
these figures will affect these others, whom are already affected by their own 
subjective experience of their life as lived. For example the executives already 
anticipate how the shareholders and potential investors might be affected by the 
figures. This is their focus of concern, that which defines them as ‘executives’.  
They want the figures to reflect (and not deny) this reality—although they also 
immediately know it cannot really do that.  The operational managers also already 
anticipate that the controllers and executives will be affected by the figures in the 
MAS in accordance with their own praxis. Likewise they also want the figures to 
reflect (and not deny) this reality, even though they, like the executives, know it 
cannot.    
 
Now, if the only relevant reality was the reality of abstract limit-shapes then they 
could simply ‘fiddle the figures’ in line with these anticipated expectations. This is 
however never the case with abstractions that function, and have its being, in the 
living praxis of organizational actors.  Managers also know that what makes those 
figures matter to them (why they concern themselves with them) and to others in 
the first instance is that they all believe and already anticipate that these figures do 
in some way reflect lived praxis itself—these figures are entangled with the 
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everyday praxis of being a manager and its various related affects. Indeed, they all 
already realise, and anticipate, that their working lives are intertwined with these 
figures in some way or another. Nevertheless, they also feel simultaneously that 
these figures do not, and cannot, reflect the singularity of the life they are living 
when they do what they do when they are ‘working with forecasts at Omega.’  It is 
this simultaneity that is at the heart of our phenomenological analysis.  Let us now 
consider in more detail these three different ways of being affected—of working 
out this simultaneity—within the context of working with the MAS outlined above. 
Let us then consider how these ways of being affected frame the way the system 
is re-embedded, or not, within trustful relations. 
 
Muriel (controller):  As was argued above, acting in large increasingly globalised 
organizations, in organizations shaped by modern management techniques, we 
tend more often than not to rely on abstract representations to govern across time 
and space. Furthermore, these abstractions are always—by their very nature—a 
reduction of our and others’ living praxis. As Boland (1993b) did, we observe that 
actors need to re-embed these representations into their ongoing living praxis as 
an active and ongoing act of interpretation. Muriel, at first glance, seems to 
interpret figures with the unaffected subject-object distance (the phenomenality of 
vision one might say) which is characterized by a certain rational objectivity: 
“operational staff view… finance view… them…objective view”. With Henry’s 
phenomenology it is possible to render intelligible, and accounts for, this specific 
effort of interpretation. From the perspective of affectedness we can say that these 
representations—even though she seems to treat them as ‘objective’—do affect 
Muriel’s life and affects her living praxis. The evidence for this claim can be seen 
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in her own words when she talks about “bad results”, “hard times”, “happy 
operational managers”, “hope”, “remain optimistic”, and so forth. In other words, 
Muriel, in living the life she lives as a controller, is bound to be affected by the 
MAS’s representations and figures. Nonetheless, her affectedness (as opposed to 
her seeming objectivity and distance) only becomes visible once we take note of 
what the phenomenology of Henry reveals to us. The numbers in MAS are not 
only for coordinating representations, objectives and bonuses. It is also a way of 
intertwining her living praxis within the web of the living praxis of all relevant 
others.  She explicitly refers to her position as being a ‘middleman’, with all the 
tensions such a position normally includes. She lives her praxis as the inter-‘face.’ 
As an inter-‘face’ she sees herself as the one who re-embeds the MAS and its 
numbers within the web of optimistic and pessimistic bonus driven managers and 
profit driven top executives. As a living being, affected by these representations, 
she is likely to find the force for taking action (to engage with these 
representations) in her affective subjectivity.  Her way to try and live with the 
affecting tension (the simultaneity) inherent to her inter-‘face’ position is to focus 
on the ‘quality’ of the representations. She tries to get “an objective view on the 
business”, and tries to “find the right balance” between operational managers and 
top managers through the numbers in the MAS.  In her affected subjectivity she 
reinterprets the process of elaborating the figures as a way “to smooth things over” 
by finding some sort of an equilibrium. Using numbers as a mechanism to resolve 
conflict appears then as an affective choice to smooth over the differences.  
Indeed we would suggest that, in more general terms, abstract representations 
such as the mathematical Walrassian market and Tayloristic time and motion 
studies should be seen as affective choices—i.e. not a necessary choice for 
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efficiency as such—but  rather as mechanisms for smoothing over tensions in the 
organization or society more generally (Shenhav, 1999).  
 
When top managers modify the representations, Muriel experiences a malaise 
from the growing discrepancy between those representations and her anticipated 
perception of the situation.  This instrumental use of the figures, to impose difficult 
objectives, may ruin her relation and trust with the operational managers. When 
she feels that she has no means to reduce the gap between the ‘difficult’ figures 
and her affective perception of the situation she modifies her interpretation of the 
situation by using commonly understood and ‘ready-made’ theories. She, for 
example talks about it as a “political game”. She also becomes sarcastic: “we’re 
thrilled about that”.  Also, to protect herself she attempts to “become very 
detached from what I have done” which leads her to inaction. Changing her 
interpretation of the situation alters her range of possible actions. It allows her to 
keep herself away from exchanges—as a “political game” she feels it does not 
implicate her. However, as Henry suggests, we cannot detach ourselves from our 
affectedness. Simply changing our interpretation of the situation may be an unreal 
(life-less) way to deal with the situation. Mark and Mike, to whom we now turn, 
suggest some other possibilities. 
 
Mike (controller) and Mark (manager):  Where Muriel tries to balance the lived 
tension and pain by dealing with the numbers in the MAS as the “objective view on 
business”, the explicit focus of Mike is “to use the data in a realistic way”. What is 
the meaning of this ‘realism’ one might ask? Mike reports that he acts with the 
sales teams in key moments. For example, he “gives them a hand setting up” and 
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“lend a hand moving” in order to prepare a remodelled shop for opening. This is 
his preferred way to make sense of the numbers. For him it is: “a good way of 
getting to know everyone as well as the sales outlet”—phenomena appear to him 
through the sharing of incarnated praxis.  We can therefore suggest that this 
realism for him means to locate the real at the level of praxis and co-praxis. To 
locate it in the shared difficulty of action and efforts as lived by affected persons in 
their specific work context (i.e. phenomenality of affectedness or the teleology of 
life).  
 
Nonetheless, we should be careful not to simply reduce this phenomenality of 
affectedness—the sharing of incarnated praxis—to notions such as ‘tacit’ or 
‘implicit’ knowledge (as is often done). Rather, the location of the real in the 
phenomenality of affectedness allows for an altogether different way of 
reembedding the representations of the MAS in the real. As Adler, reviewing 
Henry, suggests: “representation renders present again what praxis immediately 
presents” (Adler, 1985: 156). Sharing – even partly – the lived action enables them 
to establish the abstract budget as “a team effort” where operational managers 
and him “rely on one another a great deal”, this is a “method… clear and open, 
with plenty of room for dialogue”. Where Muriel experiences herself as a 
middleman that can achieve safety from the inherent tensions by attempting to 
produce—through her expertise and judgement—exact representations, Mike 
derives his confidence from sharing with the teams their lived incarnate reality.  
 
When the figures are altered by top management it is not his inner confidence that 
is in question. He does not need to look for a ‘ready-made’ interpretation of the 
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situation, as Muriel does. He only observes that the corrections “weren’t realistic 
for the sales outlet”, accepting the risk that the figures may lose their meaning. 
Indeed, he suggests that if these changes or corrections, which occur as 
shift/changes in the abstract world, do not find their translation in the real lifeworld 
then they “get lost”.  This is also a question of affective life energy. Indeed, 
abstract representations do not generate, per se, the strength to tackle challenging 
objectives. Rather, this comes from living praxis itself. For example, Mike found 
the energy to challenge the unrealness of the SPP formula—by showing that it 
created an unfair assessment of the different shops—because he was already 
affected by a shared lived experience of these differences in living praxis. This 
example illustrates how controllers, who in some way share lived praxis, could act 
in a domain beyond merely being middlemen (as Muriel seems to believe).  
 
Mark is also affected by the governmental control of abstract system such as 
MAS. In dealing with these abstractions he suggests that “its people who make up 
the system”, that “Man is at the heart of the system: he’s the one who optimize it –
or not, as the case may be”. In these remarks he seems to recall what Henry 
would consider the site of value creation—human living praxis. This has specific 
consequences for the way he works. He rejects abstract and anonymous 
information which is transferred by e-mail “I hate e-mail” and focuses on 
“interpersonal skills”, face-to-face encounters, meetings, visits, talks, and so forth. 
This is his preferred way to share real life experiences, to find solutions, to achieve 
cooperation and so forth. In contrast to his approach he claims that “the system 
should be adapted to suit the people who make it work”. As such he dedicates 
significant time to get a budget which will reflect and help living praxis “we spend 
     44
time putting together a realistic budget”. For him the figures are a path not an end 
destination in itself.  It seems clear that both Mark and Mike express undoubtedly 
their view that abstractions must find their vital meaning in living praxis (i.e. they 
see the importance of ‘face-work’ as suggested by Giddens (1990).  
 
It is certainly worth noting the frequent use of the pronoun “we” in Mikes 
sentences.  In contrast Muriel tends to mostly use the pronoun “they”.  We would 
suggest that the sharing of living praxis enables the achievement of a certain unity 
of differences (manager and controller) which is not the case with the approach of 
Muriel, which is rather to achieve “objective” figures. We might describe the way of 
Mike and Mark relates to figures as a ‘realistic’ approach. By this we mean that 
they tend to take for granted the already ongoing living praxis as the basis for 
interpreting, evaluating and responding. They also tend to place their emphasis on 
making the figures reflect, rather than deny, at least in some way, their shared 
living praxis. In this way, both the figures in the MAS and the controller’s 
comments provide a clear sense of the level of performance they are confident 
they can deliver. However, they still need to deal with the fact that the figures can, 
and will almost inevitably, become unrealistic. 
 
Mark’s way to react to such changes in the figures is first and foremost affective 
and rooted in living praxis: “we’re not thrilled when it’s all changed”, we say “ooh 
dear, it’s going to be tough”.  Because the previous forecasts were built on a 
realistic basis changes to these are immediately perceived by Mark—at the 
affectedness level—as requiring intense effort.  Given the way Mark relates to the 
world, the representations (figures and targets coming through the MAS) are 
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always already interpreted and valued by him as they appear in the light of his life. 
One might say that his consciousness is always informed (i.e. judgement and 
interpretation) via the affectedness of his living praxis.  Thus, we would suggest 
that—although differently for Muriel, Mike and Mark—the interpretation of the 
figures always assumes affectedness (the teleology of life) as its original source of 
meaning—i.e. it is not interpretation (or the interpretive process) as such that 
creates meaning, as is so often argued by authors in the information systems and 
information science disciplines.  These operations of consciousness have as their 
necessary condition, and their teleology, the subjective and affective life of the 
lifeworld (as argued by Husserl and Henry). Of course distant senior management 
must be careful not to impose abstractions on the living praxis of employees so 
that those objectives that are valued as “tough” do not become valued as 
“impossible”. This might lead to a situation where the figures are simply dismissed 
as ‘abstract numbers’ that mean ‘very little if at all’ and as such become ignored.  
 
Janet (controller) and Judith (manager): Janet makes a clear distinction 
between abstract representations (phenomenality of representation) and shop 
floor events: “even though we do spend days on end poring over figures, we see 
the buyers and the operational managers… which means we’re not just dealing 
with abstract ideas all day”.  She expresses clearly her need to re-embed the 
figures through face-work with managers. Nevertheless she also seems to 
understand top management’s expectations as expressed in the figures: “It’s easy 
to know what Management wants and so we lean towards their way of thinking”. 
She sees her role as trying to ‘find out exactly why things aren’t going well’ 
(according to figures). Thus, taking into consideration “abstract ideas” and the 
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‘operational managers’ lived experience she lives her organisational life as a 
negotiator who “feels” the limits of the abstract numbers by listening to the living 
praxis of operational managers: “they (the operational managers) put a stop to that 
[changing of figures] because things can get a little tough when we start off pretty 
high.…” 
 
Janet takes time to listen, she helps managers to represent their particular 
circumstances in the forecast figures in order to make them realistic with respect 
to their living praxis, as Judith (operational manager) explains: “To prepare my 
forecasts … I also mention that last year we had the war in Iraq and so on. I write 
a whole list on a sheet of paper with all the important elements … I also mention 
that with fewer flights to care about, my team will have more time to take care of 
my clients who need information.” Judith finds the input from Janet very satisfying 
because it allows her to demonstrate, through the figures, her intimate knowledge 
of business life as well as allowing her to establish forecasts (representations) 
coherent with her lived experience (“reality” in her words): “The whole point (of the 
forecasts) is to stick to reality: it’s very gratifying to show that I know my business.”  
The knowledge she gains through elaborating the abstract representations also 
helps her to justify, through the figures, her local decisions to her director: “If we go 
way over I call my director to explain… that’s really exciting for the table – we 
didn’t use to have that”.  Judith lives an affective experience, a kind of excitement 
at being able to argue through these abstractions.  Janet also brings external 
solutions to ‘improve the figures’ in order to avoid the situation where managers 
would find it ‘too tough’: “we have an operation going with Financial Control and 
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Purchasing to increase sales [figures] as quickly as possible and it has an 
immediate impact on the Profit and Loss account”. 
 
Although the main level of discussion that Janet and Judith draw upon when 
discussing the MAS seems to be ‘the figures’ it also seems clear that the 
underlying basis for making sense of these ‘figures’ is the living praxis of the 
managers. It seems that the goal of a ‘good negotiation’ is to reach a sort of 
equilibrium between the abstract figures required and liveable practices—the 
teleology of abstraction and the teleology of people life as Henry would say. Such 
a process of reaching an agreement creates a sense of mutual responsibility “We 
usually call each other before we change anything” (Judith).  In such a context 
decisions taken by top management, without prior communication, leads to a lot of 
dissatisfaction: “Then we hear on the grapevine that the budget has been 
changed. It’s a pity we weren’t told over the phone first”. In such cases life 
experience becomes subordinated to what appears as abstract imperatives and 
Janet suffers because of a lack of consideration for her work being altered by “so 
many people… without asking me”. As a consequence she is not motivated to 
account for the discrepancies between actual figures and forecasts: “we would 
[normally] really have a close look at the differences between actual figures and 
forecasts but now….” (Janet). 
 
To sum up: in the three different (but somehow similar) experiences presented 
above we see managers dealing with the abstract numbers of the forecasts in 
different ways. They are all aware (as most managers are) that these numbers do 
not necessary reflect their and their team’s living praxis. Indeed a lot of the 
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interpretation, negotiation, discussion, etc. that surround these figures is informed 
by this deviation or tension between the duplicity of abstract numbers and living 
praxis. The outcome in these cases are however very different. At one level of 
analysis these differences might be dismissed as different emotional responses, 
which have little to do with the problem of “getting the job done”. Such a response, 
not uncommon, misses the very important insights that Henry’s phenomenology of 
life provides. What these cases show us is that the suffering, joy, pain and malaise 
that emerge from this intertwinement of abstract reality and living praxis is the real 
stuff of organisational behaviour. It is the very ground that grounds all 
interpretation, discussion, negotiation and agreement (or disagreement).  If we 
deny, or dismiss it, we will miss what is most essential.  Affectedness is the source 
rather than the outcome of dealing with disembedding organising practices—or 
time-space distanciation—in increasingly abstract organisational landscape (for 
example the emergence of evidence based management (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006) 
and audit cultures (Strathern, 2000)).  Subjective affective life thus appears as the 
ontological ground that renders possible the re-embedding (and re-embodying) of 
abstract systems in time-space distanciation—the intertwining of the abstract and 
the lifeworld.    
6. Some conclusions and implications 
If one accepts Henry’s phenomenology as a legitimate account of the experience 
of life in organisations then one might ask what the implications would be if one 
would take such an approach seriously? There are many but we will only highlight 
a few here. In terms of information systems we would suggest that accepting this 
approach might call for a shift from the hegemony of rationality (based on abstract 
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numbers) to a situation in which reasonableness based on teleology of people life 
is given equal legitimacy—to acknowledge that the real value of knowledge 
derives from living praxis rather than from abstract codifications. This is not to say 
that abstract knowledge and rationality is wrong or illegitimate. It is rather to 
suggest that it is its hegemonic status that needs to be questioned.  This is, 
however, not necessarily a humanistic call or endeavour, although it might be 
construed this way.  It is rather a suggestion that the denial of the power of living 
praxis will in the long run undermine the vital energy of life itself and lead to a 
systematic condition of malaise—which might manifest itself as stress or anxiety or 
even in the nihilistic excesses of hyper capitalism. One might suggest that 
evidence of this is already appearing, for example, in the rapidly increasing levels 
of absenteeism in many contemporary organisations and in the nihilistic excess of 
the recent credit crunch.  More specifically, if we accept Henry’s account then we 
ought to design organising processes in such a way as to create opportunities for 
living praxis to be legitimately shared. One would certainly advocate for more 
regular face-to-face meetings, or “facework rituals” as Giddens refers to it. 
However with Henry we suggest that it is not just more meetings which are 
needed, but meetings where the legitimacy of reasonableness is acknowledged, 
and where forms of dialogue that allows for the sharing of feelings and concerns 
are respected and encouraged. Having said this we must emphasise again that we 
are not calling for sentimentalism—which is associated with superficiality and 
instrumentalism in equal measure—but for the possibility of discernment in the 
light of one’s affective life and its teleology. This call is grounded in Henry’s 
phenomenology and its decisive reversal of traditional western thought: “It is not 
consciousness (derived from objective knowledge) which determines life, it is life 
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which determines consciousness” (1976: 401). This is, we would suggest, the only 
way to relate to the reality of everyday organisational life, i.e. to be realistic. Indeed 
we would claim that when knowledge is not merely derived from general 
frameworks but from lived, incarnated experience, unexpected innovation may 
indeed occur.  As Henry asserts: “one should not start from what people say, 
imagine, … one should start from really active people and from their real vital 
process” (1976: 403).  Thus, we would suggest, with Henry, that realism is not first 
and foremostly about or in the ‘facts’ but in the dynamism of life itself.  If we really 
take this seriously then the design of ‘information systems’ that indeed ‘inform’ 
would be very different. The current emphasis on analysis and method might be 
replaced by an emphasis on practices as practiced.  Even when information or 
knowledge by necessity needs to be abstract (through ERP or MAS systems for 
example) and our interactions meditated through abstractions (through e-mail for 
example), information, to be powerful, needs not only to be reembedded but also, 
in a radical way, re-embodied (in the affective flesh as it were).  
 
For us as researchers Henry’s phenomenology also has many implications. First 
we might say that we need not be caught in the debate between the positivistic 
approach (based on lifeless abstract representations) and a relativistic 
interpretative approach which is often critiqued for providing “just another 
interpretation”.  As researchers we can ground our (participant) observations in the 
teleology of our life, in subjectivity and not subjectivism. This offers us a critical 
standpoint, which is different from the Habermassian logic of argument. We can do 
research, in an axiologic starting point, from the real of life (which manifests itself 
through people suffering, caring, being excited, elated, bored, and so forth). This is 
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the ongoing challenge for us as researchers—i.e. to make our research real, or at 
least speak of the real.  
With this work we are able to legitimise what has become illegitimate through the 
massive expansion of scientific management and governmental practices. For us it 
is a radical transformation from the pervasive abstraction and distanciation of work 
(brought about by information and communication technology) to the meaning-
giving source of work, which is affective life itself. We would suggest that 
organisation studies (and managers) would make a fatal mistake to ignore the 
work of Henry.  
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Appendix: Schedule of formal interviews 
 
08/04/2004 Treasurer  
09/04/2004 Management Accountant (Mike)  
09/04/2004 Head of Management Accounting departement  
14/04/2004 Management Accountant  
14/04/2004 Management Accountant (Muriel)  
15/04/2004 Head of Accounting departement  
15/04/2004 Management Accountant  
20/04/2004 Management Accountant  
20/04/2004 Buyer  
23/04/2004 Buyer (Perfume & Cosmetics)  
27/04/2004 Category Manager (Perfume & Cosmetics)  
28/04/2004 Head of Subsidiary (Roissy)  
28/04/2004 Buyer in Subsidiary (Roissy)  
28/04/2004 Management Accountant in Subsidiary (Roissy)  
29/04/2004 Head of Management Accounting department  
29/04/2004 Management Accountant  
03/05/2004 Category Manager (Alcool/Tobacco)  
04/05/2004 Operational Manager (Roissy) (Alcool/Tobacco) (Mark)  
04/05/2004 Operational Manager (Roissy) (Perfume & Cosmetics) (Michael)  
04/05/2004 Operational Manager (Roissy) (Hi-Fi/Video) (Sam)  
04/05/2004 Inventory coordinator (Roissy)  
05/05/2004 Operational Manager of non parisian airports  
06/05/2004 Buyer(Alcool/Tobacco)  
06/05/2004 Category Manager (Hi-Fi/Video)  
06/05/2004 Buyer/Marketing (Hi-Fi/Video)  
07/05/2004 Head of Human Resource department  
07/05/2004 IT Manager  
07/05/2004 Management Accountant Parent Company  
10/05/2004 Operational manager (Orly) (Perfume & Cosmetics)  
10/05/2004 Operational manager (Orly) (Alcool/Tobacco)  
13/05/2004 Omega Vice president  
13/05/2004 IT Director  
19/05/2004 Operational manager (Lyon) (all products)  
08/06/2004 Omega Chief Financial Officer (John)  
16/06/2004 Omega Président (Barry)  
 
Only formal interviews are noted here.  
 
